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the appointment of a nonresident representative. If it is found that he
has no "real and substantial" interest in the controversy, the action must
be dismissed. Thus, an action may be extensively litigated resulting in ex-
pense and loss of time to the parties without a determination on the merits
of the case.
The acceptance of McSparran in other circuits is difficult to predict.
Since McSparran supports the general trend toward reducing diversity
jurisdiction, it may be followed by other circuits. A practical consideration
is the present congestion of the federal courts."s Since a large portion of
actions in federal courts are diversity actions,"5 congestion would be re-
duced by following McSparran.
Dan M. Cain
Medical Malpractice: "Locality" Rule Abandoned in
Massachusetts
During the delivery of her baby, Brune was administered a spinal anes-
thetic by Belinkoff, a specialist in anesthesiology practicing in New Bed-
ford, Massachusetts. A partial paralysis developed in her left side. Brune
sued Belinkoff for malpractice, contending that he had negligently given
her an overdose of the anesthetic pontocaine. Belinkoff had administered
eight milligrams of pontocaine' to Brune, and medical evidence' demon-
strated that good medical practice required a dosage of five milligrams or
less. However, there was also evidence that the larger dosage was custo-
mary in New Bedford for a vaginal delivery
The trial court refused to give Brune's requested charge that, as a spe-
cialist, Belinkoff owed her the duty to have and use the care and skill com-
monly possessed and used by similar specialists in like circumstances. In-
stead the trial court charged the jury that the defendant's conduct need
only equal the standard of professional care and skill possessed by others in
the New Bedford community, even though this standard might be fifty
per cent inferior to the Boston standard.4
3s See 1966 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTs, ANN.
REP.
a Id. at 170. In the fiscal year of 1966, of 70,906 civil cases commenced in district courts,
20,245 were based on diversity.
' Eight milligrams of pontocaine in one cubic centimeter of ten per cent solution of glucose.
Eight physicians, apparently local doctors, testified as to the standard of care in New Bedford.
The standard of care in other areas was proved through the use of medical textbooks. In the oral
argument of the case, plaintiff's counsel questioned the court's refusal to allow testimony of ex-
perts from without the community while admitting textbooks whose authors were not from the
same community.
a New Bedford obstetricians applied suprafundi pressure (pressure applied to the uterus) during
delivery which required a higher level of anesthesia.
.. 'The complete charge given by the trial court on the standard of care issue was: The defend-
ant 'must measure up to the standard of professional care and skill ordinarily possessed by others
in his profession in the community, which is New Bedford, and its environs, of course where he
practices, having regard to the current state of advance of the profession. If, in a given case, it
were determined by a jury that the ability and skill of the physician in New Bedford were fifty
1969]
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Brune was denied recovery in the trial court. Held, reversed: One hold-
ing himself out as a medical specialist should be held to the standard of
care of the average member of the profession practicing in his specialty,
taking into account the general advances in the medical profession and
the defendant doctor's accessibility to medical facilities. Brune v. Belinkoff,
235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "LOCALITY" RULE
It is well settled that a medical doctor owes his patients the duty to pos-
sess a minimum standard of skill and care, but the standard by which
a doctor's conduct should be judged has long troubled the courts. In the
nineteenth century, rigid application of uniform standards to all physicians
without regard to special conditions or particular circumstances was con-
sidered too harsh' because medical facilities differed in the various sections
of the country, and poor communications made it difficult for doctors in
one part of the country to learn of recent medical developments in an-
other.' The country doctor could not be expected to have the equipment,
libraries, access to hospitals or the broad-spectrum experience of city doc-
tors.' Therefore, courts formulated a rule based on geographic considera-
tions. This maxim, the "locality" rule, provided that a doctor owed his pa-
tient the duty to exercise only that degree of skill which would have been
exercised by an average doctor in good standing practicing in the same
locality.!
Though the strict locality rule seemingly was based on sound policy, it
nevertheless worked a hardship on the plaintiff attempting to prove medi-
cal negligence. To do so, the plaintiff had to produce a colleague of the
defendant practicing in the same community to testify to the local stand-
ard of care and defendant's breach of it." No doctor practicing outside of
the defendant's community was considered to be sufficiently familiar with
local practice to qualify as a witness. 1 Since doctors practicing in the same
community are notoriously hesitant to testify against their colleagues," it
percent inferior to that which existed in Boston, a defendant in New Bedford would be required to
measure up to the standard of skill and competence and ability that is ordinarily found by physi-
cians in New Bedford."
'Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79 (1950); see also Annot., 57 A.L.R. 974
(1928). For a discussion of the standard, see McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,
12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1958).
'41 AM. JUR. Physicians and Surgeons § 84 (1942).
'Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872); Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870); Ramsland v.
Shaw, 341 Mass. 56, 61, 166 N.E.2d 894, 901 (1960); Ernen v. Crofwell, 272 Mass. 172, 172
N.E. 73 (1930); Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt. 557 (1876); Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504,
30 N.W. 674 (1886).
'Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880).
'Id. Small v. Howard is generally considered the first case to adopt the "locality" rule. How-
ever, the Small court did not actually use the words "same community" but used the words "in
similar localities with opportunities for no larger experience." The words "same community" were
grafted onto Small by later decisions. Goldman, Malpractice Cases in Massachusetts, 40 MAss. L.Q.
27, 28-29 (1955).
l'Many courts have held that the only admissible proof in establishing negligence against a
doctor is a qualified medical expert. Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of Silence": Statutory and
Common Law Innovations, 45 MINN. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (1961).
11 Id.
"Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REV. 250,
259 (1956). The "conspiracy of silence" which Belli discusses exists for several reasons. Most doc-
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was often difficult, and sometimes impossible" for the plaintiff to produce
expert testimony regarding the defendant doctor's alleged negligence.
II. MODIFICATION OF TIE "LOCALITY" RULE
As communications and medical facilities improved, and as courts be-
came increasingly aware of the difficulties of proof created by the strict
locality rule, various modifications of the rule were made. The courts ex-
panded the standard of care to include the "same or similar localities," thus
including other towns of the same general size and character." Statutes
were enacted which permitted out-of-state doctors to testify 5 and which
allowed the plaintiff to use medical books as substitutes for expert testi-
mony." Later court decisions further broadened the original rule by ex-
panding the geographical area which constitutes the community,"7 by
treating the size and character of the community merely as a factor to be
considered rather than as a definite, single standard to be applied, " and by
emphasizing such considerations as available medical facilities and expe-
rience. 9
Three recent decisions illustrate the quickening judicial trend away
from the strict "locality" rule. In Pederson v. Dumouchel" the Washing-
ton supreme court held it reversible error to limit the standard of care
solely to that of the same or similar geographical area. In Douglas v. Bus-
sabarger" the same court noted that there is no general rule requiring ex-
pert medical testimony as to the standard of care. In the third decision,"
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia aptly stated the rationale
for abandoning the strict locality rule. Holding that a New York City
doctor who was familiar with the standard of medical practice in areas
similar to Charleston, West Virginia, was qualified to testify on the stand-
ard in Charleston, the court stated: "[T]he doctor in the rural area now
tors believe that lay jurors are not equipped to cope with the technicalities of the medical pro-
fession as presented in malpractice cases (Kantor, With Justice for All, 30 TEx. B.J. 23 (1967)),
and therefore may find for the plaintiff when in fact no negligence has occurred (Note, The Cali-
fornia Malpractice Controversy, 9 STAN. L. REv. 731, 734 (1957)). Many doctors dislike the
legal cross-examination and feel that they are made to appear ridiculous before the jury. In addi-
tion, doctors who do testify sometimes must face the disfavor of the medical association for "un-
professional conduct" (Bernstein v. Alameda Contra Costa County Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App.
2d 241, 293 P.2d 862 (1956), where a local doctor was charged with violation of the Principles of
Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association. One of the seven charges brought against him
alleged that the doctor had rendered a report containing unfavorable remarks about another doctor
to a workmen's compensation commission for use by the commission in a pending action), and the
possibility of being dropped by their malpractice carriers (Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465,
234 P.2d 34, 46 (1951) (Carter, J., dissenting)).
"3Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959).
4 E.g., Nation v. Gueffroy, 172 Ore. 673, 142 P.2d 688 (1943).
15Wls. STAT. § 147.14(2)(a) (1957).
1SMAss. GFN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79-C (Supp. 1968).
"WE.g., Tanner v. Sanders, 247 Ky. 90, 56 S.W.2d 718, 720 (1933); Michael v. Roberts, 91
N.H. 499, 23 A.2d 361 (1941).
"SE.g., Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241
Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950); Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 135-37, 155 N.W. 1077,
1080-91 (1916).
"Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940). See also Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I.
67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956).
20431 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1967).
2"438 P.2d 829 (Wash. 1968).
2Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967).
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has available to him most of the same facilities as does the practitioner in
the city." 3 In addition, the court observed, ready means of communica-
tion now enable the doctor to keep abreast of medical developments and
practices regardless of his location.
One authority" has said that the current tendency is to abandon any
precise formula, making the standard of care merely one of "good medical
practice."' However, the majority of recent cases apparently still adhere
to some form of the "locality" rule. The recent and consistent use of such
phrases as "in the same or similar localities, ' '  in the community,"" "in
like localities,"" or "in the same neighborhood"" continue to make the
locality an important circumstance in qualifying the standard of care.
Texas courts" early adopted the "locality" rule, and a 1965 case"' said that
the defendant doctor is required only to exercise that degree of care, skill




III. BRUNE v. BELINKOFF
Massachusetts, the first state to adopt the "locality" rule in the case of
Small v. Howard," now has led the way in repudiating it in Brune v. Bel-
inkoff."' As applied to the medical profession of today, the rule enunciated
in Small" was found by the Brune court to be unsuited to present-day
conditions. The court viewed a standard of medical care based solely on
geography as no longer valid in view of modern developments in transpor-
tation, communication and medical education, all of which tend to pro-
mote a certain degree of standardization within the profession. According-
ly, the court determined that the "locality" rule should be abandoned.
Brune illustrates the inappropriateness of the "locality" rule today. The
defendant practiced only fifty miles from Boston, one of the medical cen-
ters of the nation. Nevertheless, the trial court, relying on the ninety-year
old case of Small,' instructed the jury that even "if the skill and ability
of New Bedford physicians were 'fifty per cent inferior' ", to that of
Boston doctors, the defendant still should be judged by New Bedford
standards. Although this may have been a correct interpretation of the
3 Id. at 167.
14 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 166-67 (3d ed. 1964).
"Sld. at 167; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 299A (1965).
"9Carrigan v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 104 N.H. 73, 178 A.2d 502 (1962).
'"Gore v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich. 1964); Harris v. Campbell, 409 P.2d
67 (Ariz. Civ. App. 1965); Goheen v. Graber, 181 Kan. 107, 309 P.2d 636 (1957).
'2Lagerpusch v. Lindley, 253 Iowa 1304, 115 N.W.2d 207 (1962).
' Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 310 P.2d 722 (1957); Snyder v. Pantaleo, 143 Conn.
290, 122 A.2d 21 (1956).
"Bowles v. Bourdon, 213 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), aff'd, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949);
Hess v. Rouse, 22 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Dunn v. Styron, 10 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928), error dismissed w.o.j.
"Levermann v. Cartall, 393 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. n.r.e.
"aId. at 93 5.
s 128 Mass. 131 (1880).
"Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
"5128 Mass. 131 (1880).
's Id.
7235 N.E.2d at 798.
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"locality" rule, as the Supreme Court of Massachusetts observed, it pro-
duced an absurd result.
After disapproving the "locality" rule, the court set forth the new test
for determination of the proper standards for both the general practitioner
and the specialist. Taking into account the advances in the profession, the
general practitioner must exercise the degree of care and skill of the av-
erage qualified practitioner. The court said that the medical resources
available to the physician may be one of the circumstances considered in
determining the skill and care required, thus making some allowance for
the type of community in which the physician practices. Similarly, the
specialist must measure up to the standard of care and skill of the average
member of the profession practicing the specialty, taking into account
the advances in the profession and the medical resources available to him.
IV. CONCLUSION
The "locality" rule is based on a premise that the standard of medical
practice differs throughout the nation. As communications, medical facili-
ties, and medical training improve, this premise continues to lose validity.
Several years ago a nation-wide survey indicated that the standard of prac-
tice by certified specialists was very similar throughout the United States.8
This survey is strong evidence that there is no longer any basis for the
"locality" rule in the United States.
Brune accurately recognizes the impracticality of the rule today and
abandons it. Should other jurisdictions follow the lead of Massachusetts,
the result will be a new, uniform standard of care which will be required
of all doctors. The adoption of such a standard probably would improve
the overall quality of medical practice, for it would impose a duty on doc-
tors to inform themselves of medical advances outside of their immediate
community. Moreover, the plaintiff in a malpractice case will have an
expanded pool of qualified experts from which to choose, for out-of-
state doctors will be able to testify. Better informed juries will thus be
able to appraise more fairly a doctor's treatment in any negligence action.
Thus, the barriers set up by the "conspiracy of silence" can be overcome.
Lynda K. Zimmerman
Oil and Gas Taxation - The Dirge of
the Abercrombie Doctrine
Taxpayer, the carried party,1 and operator, the carrying party, owned
working interests in certain properties located in Louisiana. The operator
8 Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REv. 884, 887-88 (1962).
'A carried interest arises when the owner of part of the working interest in mineral property
agrees to assume the costs of drilling and developing applicable to the share of the other owner(s)
of the working interest. The operator, or carrying party, is allowed to recoup the carried party's
1969]
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contracted2 to bear the costs and expenses of drilling and developing the
properties and to recoup taxpayer's share of such costs from the produc-
tion, if, as, and when produced, from a specified percentage of taxpayer's
working interest.' Taxpayer was not personally liable for the advances and
the remaining percentage of his working interest was unencumbered. He
reported income and claimed depletion allowance, intangible drilling and
development costs and depreciation proportionate to both his unencum-
bered interest and the interest to which operator looked for recoupment.
The Commissioner disallowed all intangible drilling and development costs
and depreciation deductions and allowed depletion based only on the in-
come from taxpayer's unencumbered interest. In the ensuing refund
suit, the trial court found for the taxpayer." Held, reversed: In a carried
interest transaction, where the carried party has obligated the production
from part of his interest to the recoupment of drilling and development
costs, the carried party does not have sufficient economic interest in the
minerals in place to claim depletion or deductions for intangibles and de-
preciation. United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 922 (1969).
I. TAXATION OF THE CARRIED INTEREST
Three types of carried interests are generally recognized.' In the Man-
ahan6 type the carried party conveys his entire working interest to the car-
rying party. The carrying party drills and develops the property and when
he has captured sufficient production to recoup his outlays, he reconveys
an agreed portion of the working interest to the carried party. During the
payout period the carrying party reports all income and claims deductions
for depletion, intangible drilling and development costs and depreciation.'
After payout, depletion is apportioned according to the parties' respective
ownership interests.
In the Herndon'-type transaction the carried party assigns only part of
his working interest to the carrying party, and in addition, assigns a pro-
duction payment out of his retained interest. The carrying party recoups
the carried party's share of development costs from the production pay-
share of such costs from production if, as and when produced. The operator is called the "carrying
party" because his capital carries the entire risk. See K. MILLER, OIL AND GAS: FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 16-1 (1968).
' There were two agreements covering a wide variety of mineral interests on two sets of prop-
erties and involving several individuals and corporations. Each of the parties had at least part of
the title to some of the leaseholds and interests comprising each set of properties.
'After payout the parties were to share income and operating expenses according to their own-
ership interests. Payout has been defined in proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (4) as: "The period
ending when the gross income attributable to all of the operating mineral interests in the well (or
wells) equals all expenditures for drilling and development (tangible and intangible) of such well
(or wells) plus the costs of operating such well (or wells) to produce such an amount."
'Cocke v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
'A fourth type of arrangement, the Abercrombie type, is apparently peculiar to the Fifth Cir-
cuit (at least as to tax consequences) and is discussed in text accompanying notes 23-34 infra.
'Manahan Oil Co., 8 T.C. 1159 (1947).
'Id.; see C. BREEDING & A. BURTON, INCOME TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION § 8.16
(1961).
'Herndon Drilling Co., 6 T.C. 628 (1946).
[Vol. 23
ment period. During the payout period, the carrying party accounts for
all income and deductions.
In the Burton-Sutton ° arrangement the carried party assigns his entire
working interest but reserves an overriding royalty for the life of the
property. Under this plan, the carrying party accounts for all tax conse-
quences less the income and depletion attributable to the overriding roy-
alty."
Notably, in each of the above arrangements tax benefits and burdens
fall to the party holding title to the particular interest in question. 2 In the
Manahan situation the carrying party holds title to the entire working
interest. In Herndon he has title to part of the working interest and the
production payment. In Burton-Sutton he owns the entire working in-
terest less the overriding royalty. A present possessory interest (title) in
the particular interest has been characterized as the controlling factor in
the taxation of carried interest arrangements."
In contrast to the title theory, the Internal Revenue Service has postu-
lated' and the Supreme Court accepted,"5 an "economic interest" concept
which has particular importance in the tax treatment of carried interest
transactions. The economic interest concept is not susceptible to clear
definition. The Internal Revenue Service's view is contained in G.C.M.
22,730 which emphasizes "economic consequences . . . irrespective of con-
veyancing formalities.'
16
The evolution of the concept began when the lessee of a mine was al-
lowed to claim depletion on the theory that the right to reduce the ore to
possession was property within the meaning of the statute." Later, in de-
termining that bonus payments were ordinary income, the Supreme Court
held in Burnet v. Harmel" that "economic consequences" control the taxa-
tion of oil and gas transactions. In 1933, the Court seemingly swept away
the last vestiges of the local property law test as affixing the depletable
interest as it observed in Palmer v. Bender" that "[t]he language of the
statute is broad enough to provide, at least, for every case in which the
taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any interest in the oil in place, and
secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extrac-
tion of the oil, to which he must look for a return of his capital?' Corn-
'Id.; see C. BREEDING & A. BURTON, supra note 7, § 8.17. However, the carrying party
is required to capitalize the cost attributable to the carried party's interest.
"Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
"Id.
"Galvin, G.C.M. 22,730-Twenty-Five Years Later, 18TH SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FouNDA-
TION INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAX 511, 524 (1967).
"Id. at 527.
14 G.C.M. 22,730, 1941-1 CUM. BULL. 214.
" Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S.
103 (1932); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S.
364 (1925).
1" G.C.M. 22,730, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 214.
'Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925); see Int. Rev. Code of 1916, ch. 463,
§ 12(a), 39 Star. 767. Deduction shall include a reasonable allowance for "the exhaustion of prop-
erty." (Now INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 611: "a reasonable allowance for depletion.")
"8287 U.S. 103 (1932).
9287 U.S. 551 (1933).
"Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
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missioner v. Southwest Exploration21 may represent the most extended
application of the economic interest concept. In that case the operator
owned offshore oil deposits but under California law was required to
utilize upland drilling sites. Taxpayer, owner of such upland sites, con-
tributed the sites in return for a net profits interest. The taxpayer was
allowed depletion on the net profits on the theory that by its contribution
of the sites it acquired an economic interest in the oil in place.
A separate problem related to depletion allowance in carried interest
transactions is allocation of deductions for intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs and depreciation. In the Manahan, Herndon and Burton-Sutton
arrangements these deductions are allowed the carrying party during pay-
out.2 This is because the carried party bears no part of the expenses but is
instead financially passive.
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND J.S. ABERCROMBIE
Originally, the Fifth Circuit treated carried interest transactions in a
manner consistent with Supreme Court decisions developing the economic
interest concept. For example, in Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner" the cir-
cuit court held that the carrying party acquired an economic interest by
virtue of the funds advanced in the form of a loan. The carried party
therefore should not have reported income or claimed deductions for de-
pletion and interest on that portion of production obligated to repay the
advances. Subsequently, in Commissioner v. Caldwell Oil Corp.,' the same
court reached a similar result, stating that "it is now ...well established
that one who has a capital investment in oil in place, or who has an eco-
nomic interest in oil to be extracted, . . . is, for income tax purposes,
treated as the owner and entitled to depletion."
In Commissioner v. J.S. Abercrombie Co.2" the Fifth Circuit abandoned
this approach. In that case the carrying party was the assignee of a work-
ing interest out of which the carried party had retained a one-sixteenth
interest. The carrying party was to recoup his advances from the net pro-
ceeds of the entire working interest. The carried party was not personal-
ly liable for the advances and during the taxable year in question there
were no net profits. The court ruled that the gross income from the one-
sixteenth interest was taxable to the carried party upon the "fundamental
principle that income is taxable to the owner of the property producing
the same, and that an assignment in anticipation of such income is ineffec-
tive to avoid taxation thereof to the real owner."2 The court analyzed the
arrangement as a loan from the carrying party to the carried party with
the latter's one-sixteenth interest mortgaged as security. The contract was
treated as fixing property rights under local law upon which the tax con-
sequences depended.
2'350 U.S. 308 (1956).
22 See note 9 supra.
23 102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1939).
24 141 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1944).
25 162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947).
26 Id. at 340.
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In Prater v. Commissioner" the Abercrombie doctrine was carried to its
logical extension when the carried party was allowed deductions for de-
pletion, depreciation and intangible drilling and development costs. This
was allowed because the carried party retained legal title to his carried
interest, notwithstanding his lack of personal liability and the fact that
the carrying party could look to his interest for recoupment.
After Prater, the Fifth Circuit seemed to limit the Abercrombie doc-
trine while at the same time citing it with approval. In Wood v. Commis-
sioner29 the taxpayer, pursuant to a divorce decree, was awarded a one-half
interest in certain oil and gas leases which she and her husband held as
community property. Her interest was pledged to the payment of com-
munity debts and she was therefore not to receive any income from pro-
duction until the debts were satisfied. The question for decision was
whether the taxpayer was taxable on the income as applied to the debts.
The court held that she had no title or interest in the property until the
debts were paid and was not taxable for such income. Although the lan-
guage-no title or interest-seems consistent with Abercrombie and even
though this was not a conventional carried interest arrangement, the re-
sult seems at odds with the title theory of Abercrombie."
The most stringent limitation on Abercrombie came in Weinert's Estate
v. Commissioner." Weinert, the carried party, assigned a one-half interest
in certain oil interests to Lehman, the carrying party. In addition, Weinert
assigned his remaining one-half interest to a trustee who was to pay all in-
come from this portion to Lehman until Lehman recouped the costs of
drilling and development. At such time the interest in trust was to revert
to Weinert. The issue was whether the carried party was taxable on the
income from the property held in trust. The court held that he was not,
observing that "income from oil and gas is taxable to the man who risks his
stake to produce oil and gas, . . . and Lehman, owning 50% of the
property assumed 100% of the risk."3 The court sought to distinguish
and thus save Abercrombie on the grounds that Weinert had no present
title or interest in the property indicating that the situation more closely
resembled Manahan and Herndon than Abercrombie and Prater. Despite
this distinction the court's reasoning directly repudiated the underlying
principles of Abercrombie. The opinion is rife with statements to the effect
that a carried interest transaction temporarily reallocates the benefits and
burdens of an oil and gas interest and that he whose capital is at risk is the
rightful reporter and depleter.
After Weinert, some commentators felt that the Abercrombie doctrine
27 273 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1959).
28 Id. at 126.
29274 F.2d 268 (Sth Cir. 1960).
'0 See id. at 273 (Judge Hutcheson dissenting): "[u]nder the undisputed facts the Abercrombie
principle and case are controlling here.
21294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961).
12 1d. at 756-58.
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was dead.3 But such was not to be the case. In 1962, in Sowell v. Com-
missioner," the Fifth Circuit again cited Abercrombie with approval.
III. UNITED STATES V. COCKE
In United States v. Cocke" the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, expressly overruled Abercrombie and applied the economic in-
terest test to carried interest transactions. The court stated that "common
law property concepts ...are relics of an age of surface use of land and
are alien to vertical and subterranean ownership."' The Palmer v. Bender 7
definition of economic interest was adopted. The court determined that
the taxpayer (1) must have acquired an interest in the minerals in place
by investment and (2) must look to the extraction of oil for a return of
his capital. Stated another way, "the income from oil and gas is taxable to
the man who risks his stake to produce oil and gas.""8 Thus, the carrying
party (operator) risked its stake and, during payout, was entitled to de-
ductions for depletion. The essence of the decision is that "taxation is not
so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with the actual
command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax
is paid.""
The decision is not without uncertainties. The Government contested
deductions claimed on that portion of the carried party's interest which
was, in effect, assigned to the carrying party. However, the computation
for which the Government contended allowed the carried party depletion
but no deductions for intangibles and depreciation on his unencumbered
portion. The court did not specifically adopt the Government's computa-
tion or directly refer to this part of the arrangement. However, the court
did conclude that "depreciation and intangible drilling and development
costs are subservient satellites of depletion in situations involving carried
interests, and that, as the spoils go to the victor, so these deductions go to
the rightful depleter."' This sweeping statement is somewhat tempered
by other language in the opinion. The court recognized that in order to
deduct depreciation, a taxpayer must have an investment in the equip-
ment. Here, the carried party had expended none of his own funds and
accordingly had a basis of zero in the equipment. Likewise, he had in-
curred no expenses for intangibles and thus did not fall within the lan-
guage of sections 162" and 212' of the Internal Revenue Code. Apparent-
ly, the statement that "these deductions go to the rightful depleter" is to
a3 RYAN, The Carried Interest in the Fifth Circuit, or, Is Abercrombie Dead, 4 Hous. L. REV.
477 (1966).
'4302 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1962).
35 3 9 9 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 922 (1969).
30 Id. at 442.
7287 U.S. 551 (1933).
"SUnited States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 445 (5th Cir. 1968), quoting Weinert's Estate v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 1961).
"9Id. at 445, citing Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).4 0 id. at 446.
T' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, 5 212.
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be read in its narrowest sense as applying only to that portion of the in-
terest from which the income has been obligated."
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit has marshalled an impressive array of authority call-
ing for the repudiation of the Abercrombie doctrine. The court's reason-
ing is particularly appealing when a carried interest such as that in Aber-
crombie, treated under the rule of that case, is compared with other types
of carried interests. In each arrangement the carried party is in the same
relative economic position: In each, he has contributed at least a part of his
working interest; in each, he has given control of the property and income
to the carrying party; and in each, he has given up beneficial use of the
income. Each arrangement temporarily reallocates the benefits and bur-
dens of developing and operating an oil lease and in each the reallocation
achieves the same economic result. Specifically, a Herndon transaction is
economically indistinguishable from an Abercrombie transaction. In each,
the carrying party has the right to the production from the carried par-
ty's interest. However, application of the Abercrombie doctrine caused op-
posite tax results on the basis of title alone. Even though in Manahan,
Herndon, and Burton-Sutton the carrying party held title to the interest
in question, the stance of the Internal Revenue Service and a long series
of Supreme Court decisions make it obvious that title should not be con-
trolling.
Cocke has been criticized on the grounds that the different forms of
carried interests are only approximately the same because the rights of
creditors, community property rights, rights under statutes of descent and
distribution, and the rights of administrators and executors vary with the
type of transaction selected.44 That such rights vary with the form of the
arrangement is clear. Furthermore, it cannot be doubted that Cocke will
affect the exercise of these rights in many situations. However, it is doubt-
ful that this is sufficient justification for retention of the Abercrombie
doctrine, particularly in light of the similarity between the economics of
the several types of carried interest transactions.
All things considered, Cocke is a step in the right direction. Policy justi-
fies favoring the carrying party. He bears the burdens, assumes the risk,
expends his capital and controls the property and income. During payout,
he is the beneficial owner of the working interest and should acquire the
tax benefit (and burdens) appurtenant thereto.
W. Ted Minick
" Apparently, the carrying party was allowed to claim the income and expenses at issue in
Cocke. United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1968). Under the rationale of Herndon
it appears the carrying party should capitalize these expenses. See note 8 supra.
44 GALVIN, Deductions: Percentage Depletion-Sharing Arrangements-Person Having Economic
Interest, 29 OIL & GAs RI'TR. 527 (1968).
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